左边是胡佛研究所的成员、美国智库「新美国（New America）」的总裁、美国外交政策与国际事物专家Anne-Marie Slaughter，右边是特朗普内阁国务院政策制定总监Kiron Skinner。在日前举办的一场外交政策研讨会上，右边这位侃侃而谈中国威胁论，甚至对中国使用「非白人」的字眼、并和「文明的冲突」相提并论，而对俄罗斯则视为「大家庭」，这些谈话引起各方的抨击。为了厘清事实，我们找到了这段访谈，进行了文字转录和翻译以查看上下文、进行较完整的理解。
在特朗普政府执政期间，从副总统彭斯（Mike Pence）到FBI局长克里斯托弗·雷（Christopher Wray）的官员都呼吁对中国采取更强硬的态度，国务卿蓬佩奧（Mike Pompeo）也表示中国对美国的「“持续民主」构成了风险，对于中美之间在学术交流、企业研发方面的疑云氛围也导致人心忡忡。胡佛研究所去年发布的《中国影响和美国利益》研究报告，把围堵、防范中国看作对于美国利益攸关的事。在这种氛围下，华裔、华夏文化、中国、黄种人以及对立意识形态等都可能被在公众意识里相互绑定，对我们并不是好的征兆。
KS：I think [a principle] it's important and a lot of the work is being done at the think tanks in Washington including your own which is doing I think some of the most interesting and innovative work on the future of our role in the world and then has to do with new regional partnerships. So I was at Harvard about a week ago they let me back in and and and so we talked about this issue of multilateralism and partnerships and some were trying to say that we're abandoning multilateralism and I said give me the evidence. We did pull out of the Paris climate accord. We did pull out of JCPOA. Then someone said and you pulled out of IMF and I said No the Russians pulled out of IMF five years ago.
KS：This is a bipartisan issue. Most of the multilateral fora, most of the international agreements were still there. They're getting stronger. I think NATO -- you know there was NATO week here in Washington recently -- the foreign ministers emerged more united, there were stronger conversations about our mutual commitments and our mutual threats, which are pretty severe. So I think when you look at the issue of partnerships we probably aren't creating another NATO very soon. That's the world's mostdurable security alliance.
KS：But there will be ways I think that we come together in regional partnerships for particular crises perhaps with the Baltic states and Poland to deal with the eastern flank threat. The northern European countries and Britain have talked about partnering with us for others. And in the end of Pacific you know we have a strategy there that was enunciated early on in the Trump administration to bring nations together to counter China, but there's a lot more…
AMS：This sounds a lot like Coalitions of the Willing.
KS：It is, and I think you've written about this, but I think that that's in some ways going to be more prominent going forward given the multiplicity of threats. This is a very different century.
AMS：So I can summarize the Trump doctrine：you know. the United States is a sovereign nation guided by its national interests that expects "I will do for you if you do for us", and if we share the burden, which is a realist view of the world. It may not be hostile to multilateralism but it certainly puts the nation's first and does not accept many constraints on sovereignty. I was intrigued. I just have to ask what's the Pompeo corollary, is there a particular difference there?
KS：Yes in fact Pompeo asked me that very question ... what I think is going on at the State Department under him is that he's attempting to really define in the broad Trump doctrine which addresses economic and defense and a broad range of policy challenges. But what I think Pompeo doctrine is, is trying to find the diplomatic angle in all aspects of what the president's attempting to do：in security, society, the economy, energy. and the international system.
AMS：So I want to ask you about how you engage in diplomacy in a world in which -- we've talked about this a lot today -- the President's essentially said in the national security strategy we see a return to great power competition. So China now and Russia and any others countries, you might name, are seen as great powers to whom we are adverse at least much of the time. How does that affect the way the State Department, the entire European department which addresses all of Europe and Russia, and of course East Asian Affairs focused on China. How does that affect the diplomacy to now see them as rival great powers.
KS：The National Security Strategy was an important document early on in the Trump administration for all the noise that people talked about at the White House and the fact that we were quickly onto our second national security adviser and new deputies. We in record time got a powerful statement in the National Security Strategy of December 2017 and it talked about a return to great power competition and that was a general H.R. McMasters. I think, big insight. I think we've evolved since then that we do have Russia and China as great power competitors. They've been that for a long time, a lot of this is are cognition of the reality that's been on the ground. But I think we're differentiating those challenges. Russia is more of a kind of a global survivor, I think, in its great power status. But China we see it as a more fundamental long term threat. That's not a partisan issue. And one of the ways in which Donald Trump has contributed to a bipartisan foreign policy consensus is on China because at the start of his presidency there wasn't the kind of understanding that China is the long term threat. It is a real problem.
AMS：So when you say "threat" I would probably say "adversary", I'm not saying "threat".
KS：I think the vocabulary is still evolving and I would I agree with you that it is an adversary. It's in this way and it's a long term fight with China, or a long term competition, and it has I think historical, ideological and cultural as well as strategic factors that a lot of Americans do not understand even in the foreign policy community and to map our chart, our understanding of the world onto theirs, I think it's a huge mistake. And what we are working on at the State Department is a comprehensive China policy now and a lot of that is being led on the seventh floor at State but in close concert with all of the bureaus who are thinking about this regional and functional at the core of their work now.
AMS：Is a strategic and economic dialogue still going with China? So Tim Geithner started this, there had been the strategic economic dialogue led by Treasury. Actually that was under George W. Bush and then when Secretary Clinton came in it became the Strategic and Economic Dialogue meaning the State Department led it not Treasury. But I don't know.
KS：So this is a very different administration and what the economists and financial people at the White House got hold of China faster than State. And so they've addressed the China trade problem. Bu what we're doing at State is to say we're in agreement with you on trade, but trade is not the only problem. And maybe not the biggest in the long run with China and perhaps it's really a symptom of the China problem which has deeper historical and strategic roots than we've understood. We have the Indo-Pacific and the trade side those are the ones that raced ahead faster but we're now looking more deeply and broadly at China and I think State is in the lead in that broader attempt to get something like a letter X for China. What Kennan wrote：you can't have a policy without an argument underneath it; and what hasn't happened in this century is that we haven't advanced the argument and that's what we're working on both the argument and the broader threat at State. And if it will happen, it will happen at the State Department.
KS：So it's different than Russia in that way and it's different as an adversarial dyad than in the 20th century with the Soviet Union in the sense that not to make light of the Cold War and the reality of a nuclear war that could have happened. And the fact that we came close in some instances. But when we think about the Soviet Union in that competition in away it was a fight within the Western family.
KS：Karl Marx was a German Jew who developed a philosophy that was really within the larger body of political thought that reaches the work that you've done that I've been involved with that has some tenets even within classical liberalism. And so in that way I think it was a huge fight within the Western family and you could look at the Soviet Union, part west, part east, but it had some openings there that got us the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 which was a really important western concept that opened the door really to undermine the Soviet Union, a totalitarian state on human rights principles.
KS：That's not really possible with China. This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology. And the United States doesn't have that before nor has it had an economic competitor the way that we have. The Soviet Union was a country with nuclear weapons a hug Red Army but a backwards economy. And that was the inside of Reagan when the intel community told him differently. He said I just don't see the signs that it can survive a technology race with the West. So in China we have an economic competitor. We have an ideological competitor one that really does seek a kind of global reach that many of us didn't expect a couple of decades ago. And I think it's it's also striking that's the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian（AMS：and I think like Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, some of those tenets but a little bit different）and all of those things together are a bit perplexing for the American foreign policy establishment and I think we have to you know take the rose colored glasses off and get real about the nature of the threat. And I think we also have to give a kind of respect for what the Chinese seek to accomplish.
AMS：I do want to press you on that the United States is not all Caucasian, right? But we're going to be majority minority by 2050 and so is that even relevant? I mean if I think about the people saw all the different races and ethnicities will make up the United States, Caucasians won't be a majority.
KS：I think it's extremely relevant because the foreign policy establishment is so narrowly defined. It's more homogenous than probably should be, given our own demographics. And that's why I think programs like the one at ASU that you've partnered with are extremely valuable in terms of developing new cadre of foreign policy elites. But when I look back to who we went to graduate school, who populates our departments at the elite university, it hasn't changed very much. And so and look at the faculties of the top 20 IR programs and public policy schools. So I think you know having diversity in all dimensions really does help you get ready for the future. And when you don't have it I think it hurt you in the foreign policy elite community is pretty locked up right now.
Assistant Secretary Kimberly Breier：“We welcome fair competition with China; but Chinese companies must operate on a level playing field, in ways where they play by the rules, and respect environmental and labor standards.”
Speeches：Remarks on "A New Era in the Americas" at the 2019 Concordia Americas Summit
I believe China is the big strategic question for the hemisphere. The U.S. Administration has taken a closer look at China’s engagement in the Americas given significant U.S. interest. China is and will remain a significant trade and investment partner for the United States and for many other countries. We welcome fair competition with China; but Chinese companies must operate on a level playing field, in ways where they play by the rules, and respect environmental and labor standards.
However, far too often China has departed from international best practices; and when it does, its opaque methods have enabled corruption and eroded good governance. I believe the region is now recognizing that the way China operates is not compatible with the system in the region. In the Western Hemisphere, all countries expect - and should demand - that infrastructure development projects feature a transparent procurement process, uphold environmental and social safeguards, and foster inclusive growth in line with the standards of international financial institutions. We all have much at stake at getting this right, as investment in the region – by China or other countries – will have a generational impact on our citizens.