作客哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院进行研究的澳大利亚前总理陆克文发表了一份题为《习近平治下的中美关系——以建设性的现实主义，来实现中美共同使命》的研究报告。

报告提出了一个核心问题：若要保持亚洲繁荣与稳定以及二战后全球根本价值和机制框架，亚太地区和全球范围的秩序变革是否会和平发生？陆克文在报告中虽然认为主体国际秩序应维持不变，但也看到了国际治理中的诸多现实挑战和国际机构与多边机制的不完善，认为对国际秩序进行部分调整势在必行。这打破了西方战略界对于国际秩序是否应变革的争论僵局，转而专注于更为实际的问题，即如何能和平的进行变革，显然是一种积极视角。

对于中美的共同目标，陆克文报告实质上分成了三个层次，简言之为：中美“和平共存、分歧共管、全球共治”。按照报告假设的中美相处五种情景，排除掉可能性极低的内爆式，在从消极到乐观的光谱上，共有四种：对抗式、竞争式、协作式、合作式。陆克文着墨最多，也最期待出现的当属中美“合作式”关系。

进而，陆克文提出了中美的共同使命：“一方面维护、加强并适当改革现有的基于规则的地区和全球秩序，另一方面抵制妄图颠覆现有秩序，损害中美关系和更广泛国际社会的势力。”这项共同使命的表述颇有深意，如果假设中美在对待主题国际秩序的看法上一致，那么中国的发力方向主要应为适当改革地区和全球秩序，而美国的发力方向主要应为抵制损害中美关系的势力，如此一来便清晰得多。

但是，这个共同使命有两个隐性前提：一来，秩序的共同性，即所有人眼中国际秩序应为同一套，不能有双重标准；二来，秩序的互利性，即所有人眼中，特别是中美双方认为现有主体国际秩序是有利的，没有动力对其进行系统性改革。显然，秩序共同性排除了美国特立独行、我行我素的可能，秩序互利性排除了中美围绕国际秩序改造发生重大冲突的可能，但这些前提都能满足么？报告在此处似乎也“一厢情愿”了些。

针对核心问题与共同使命，陆克文给出了最具潜在创新价值的核心理念：“同梦想共使命下的建设性现实主义”。粗看起来，表述结构极富汉语特色令人亲切，但似乎又过于复杂和术语化而难以理解。将此概念拆开来看，其根本特征在于“现实主义”，这不仅是包括中美两国在内的国际社会最普遍和广泛采用的思维路径，也是报告提出致敬的基辛格博士毕生专长的学术范式，更是对当前中美关系与面临挑战最恰当的刻画依据。与此同时，在“现实主义”前加上略显繁琐的“同梦想共使命下的建设性”，是为了强调此理念与现实主义的区别。

现实主义的思维范式有一个根本性的困境，联系此报告的内容，可转换为三个紧密相关的疑问：在现实主义中，战略信任是否存在？如果存在，战略信任是否可积累？即使可积累，战略信任是否可以解决根本利益分歧？从理论的角度，这三个问题都很难有令人乐观的答案。也正因为如此，中美两国的决策者和学术界的专家才纷纷寻找避免中美陷入大国冲突悲剧的方案。换言之，陆克文提出的建设性现实主义与习近平主席提出的新型大国关系其宗旨是一致的。

建设性现实主义，是在管控分歧避免严重冲突的前提下，利用合作不断积累政治互信，当其达到一定水平就有利于根本分歧的解决，而双边、地区和全球的共同治理也可以达到更为理想的水平。从学术的分野看，此概念更适合被称为具有现实主义底色的“建构主义”。用陆克文的话说，这一核心理念对于中美两国而言均要“可解释、可理解、可接受”，从报告展现出的中英文双语娴熟的表述和封面上别具匠心的中美阴阳互融图案便可见一斑。

报告中还有一些亮点值得重视。首先，报告总体上支持中美学术和政策界的主流判断，驳斥中国崩溃论等无稽之谈。其次，报告认为当前中国领导人具备更强决策权威和政策弹性两大特征，在许多问题上“双赢”是实际可能的，一些重大战略交易同样具有现实操作性。再有，报告在双边、地区和全球层次列出中美可合作的领域和实现途径，尤其是将东亚峰会转变为亚太共同体的建议非常具体，强调其应合并东盟防长论坛，固定会期与地点，首要关注安全并成立类似欧盟式的总部。最后，报告提出中美应将双边外交磋商机制从战略与经济对话，提升为元首定期工作会晤，并应设立核心联络人，或许是在期待两国国安会的国家安全事务助理（中方为相应职位）充任这一角色。

另外，报告中的一些观点和判断也存在疑问。一是报告认为“新型大国关系”概念逐步退出奥巴马政府的公共政策讨论令人不解；二是报告不仅将“亚洲安全观”替换为“亚太安全观”，更将其基本等同于“亚洲自主安全观”是显然的理解偏狭；三是报告过于自信认为中国愿意在朝鲜问题上向美国做出重大政策让步，甚至还提出如果无法达成协议，应该强化反导系统这样的反效果措施；四是对亚洲经济与安全两个领域呈现出的战略两极化加剧的判断过于悲观，且与亚太共同体的建设预期相违背。

总体而言，陆克文这份“澳式亚洲观”的中美关系报告，实现了其愿意做解决问题桥梁和东西方沟通桥梁的作用，这也是此报告研究价值的另一种体现。（作者系清华大学中美关系研究中心助理研究员张旭东）

UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S RISE UNDER XI JINPING
理解习近平治下的中国崛起

THE HONOURABLE KEVIN RUDD
26TH PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
PRESIDENT OF THE ASIA SOCIETY POLICY INSTITUTE
陆克文
第26任澳大利亚总理
亚洲协会政策研究院主席

ADDRESS TO CADETS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT
MONDAY 5 MARCH 2018
对西点军校学生的演讲
2018年3月5日

Next week marks the 216th anniversary of the founding of the West Point Military Academy. Its founding came less than 20 years after the defeat of the British at Yorktown in 1781. It followed the decision by President Thomas Jefferson to establish the United States Military Academy just after his inauguration in 1801. Indeed the United States continental army first occupied this place on 27 January 1778, barely two years into the Revolutionary War, when things were not proceeding all that well against the British in that great conflagration. So you have been here at West Point since virtually the first birth-pangs of this great Republic.
下周将是西点军校建校216周年。在英国于约克镇1781年战败后的20年内，托马斯·杰佛逊总统在他1801年的就职演讲后签署了成立西点军校的命令。事实上，美国陆军在1778年1月17日，也就是独立战争爆发的两年后战况并不乐观时，就占领了西点要塞。因此，西点军校可谓是和这个伟大的共和国一同诞生的。（在这个伟大的共和国走向独立的阵痛中就存在了。）
Over the span of history, this nation has grown from thirteen fissiparous colonies to become the most powerful nation on earth. And while the challenges have been many, you have preserved the flame of liberal democracy throughout the nation’s rise.
在这二百多年的历史中，美利坚合众国从北美十三殖民地发展成为了世界上最强大的的国家。虽然自建立以来，这个国家也遇到过无数的困难和挑战，但民主和自由之火从未熄灭。
When this nation was being born, China was at its height. In 1799, the Qianlong Emperor died, having reigned for over 60 years. His grandfather, the Kangxi Emperor, had reigned for 61 years until 1722. Between both their reigns, the territorial expanse of the Chinese Empire virtually doubled, occupying some 10 per cent of the world’s land area, 30 percent of the world’s population, and 32 percent of the world’s economy.
美国建立之时，中国正处于她最繁荣强盛的时期。乾隆皇帝在执政长达60年后，于1799年去世。他的祖父，康熙皇帝，在位61年后，卒于1722年。在康乾盛世，中国的领土几经扩张、经济不断发展壮大，拥有全世界百分之十的土地，百分之三十的人口，以及占世界经济的近三分之一。
Although the United States sought to establish consular relations with China in 1784, this was rebuffed by Qianlong’s court, delaying the establishment of diplomatic relations until 1844 with the Treat of Wangxia. By this stage, China had already suffered its first major defeat at the hands of the British during the First Opium War. The second defeat would follow less than 20 years later at the hands of the British and the French. And so began China’s “Century of National Humiliation” until the birth of the People’s Republic in 1949.
美国在1784年时就有意与中国建立领事关系，但被乾隆皇帝回绝。两国直到1844年签署《中美望夏条约》时，才算是正式建立外交关系。那时的中国已经遭受了中英第一次鸦片战争的失败。在不到二十年后的第二次鸦片战争中，中国再次败给英法联合组成的侵华远征军。而两次鸦片战争标志着中国“百年耻辱”的开端 —— 这“百年耻辱”在1949年中华人民共和国成立时才结束。
As for Australia, proudly an ally of the United States since we first fought together in the trenches in 1918, our short history, at least as a settler society, has been considerably more recent than either China or the US. Although our indigenous peoples, Aboriginal Australians, are the oldest continuing cultures on earth, going back 60,000 years. Because Washington’s continental army prevailed at Yorktown in 1781, not only did Britain lose these colonies, it also lost its convict dumping ground at Savannah, Georgia. Back in the British Admiralty, after the Treaty of Paris in 1783, they dusted off the navigation charts of James Cook taken some 13 years before, and in 1788 established a convict colony and the first European settlement in what we now call Sydney, Australia.
对于澳大利亚而言，我们很骄傲从一战开始，成为美国的盟友。我们的历史，作为一个被殖民地的历史，相较于中美而言都很短。当然， 澳大利亚的原住民，有着世界上最古老的文化。其历史可追溯到六万年前。
由于华盛顿大军在约克镇的全面胜利，英国不仅失去了这些殖民地，同时也失去了像乔治亚州萨瓦纳市这样的英国罪犯流放地。在1783年的巴黎条约之后，英国海军开始重新使用詹姆斯·库克13年前绘制的航海图，并于1788年在如今的悉尼建立了澳大利亚第一个罪犯流放地和欧洲殖民地。
China, because of its proximity and size, has loomed large in the Australian national imagination ever since. Just as it now looms large in the global imagination. Not least because China’s new leadership, under Xi Jinping, as of the very day he first came to power as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party five years ago, claimed that China’s national mission was now one of “national renaissance”（guojia fuxing）.
中国，由于其地理位置之相近以及其幅员之辽阔，一直在澳大利亚的国家民族想象中赫然耸立 —— 正如今天中国在全球想象中的赫然形象一样。尤其是在五年前，习近平当选中共中央总书记后，他不断强调实现中华民族的伟大复兴是近代以来最重要的国家任务之一。
Xi Jinping, in rallying his party to a future vision for his country, looks deeply to China’s history as a source of national inspiration. China’s national pride at the historical achievements of the great dynasties of the Qing, Ming, Song, Tang, and the Han is palpable. The Chinese political leadership harness their national past selectively, always carefully using rose-coloured glasses, omitting those chapters which may be more problematic for China’s current national narrative. But then again, China’s leaders are no more guilty of this than other countries.
习近平，在团结党内重要领导集体共同探讨国家的未来时，对中国的历史深表关注，认为中国的历史为其未来提供了重要的启示。中华民族对清、明、宋、唐、以及汉代的历史成就的自豪感是显而易见的。当然，中国的领导人在回视历史时也同样仔细戴着玫瑰色的眼镜，有意忽视一些会对当代历史描述产生问题的章节。不过话说回来，世界上所有国家的领导人对待历史的态度也都差不多。

Nonetheless, for those who are professionally charged with interpreting China’s future, as you are in this great military academy, it means that we must also take time to understand China’s past. To understand how China perceives the world around it. And to understand how it now perceives its own national destiny in the turbulent world of the 21st century.
尽管如此，对那些专业研究中国未来发展的人而言，包括在这所优秀军校里学习的你们，去理解中国的历史和过去，理解中国对世界的看法，以及理解中国对自己在21世纪中国家命运的看法都是十分必要的。
It is one of the reasons why after more than 40 years of studying Chinese language, history, politics, economics, and culture, I have embarked on a fresh research project at Oxford University, seeking to define Xi Jinping’s worldview. This is not a static process. This is a dynamic process. China is as much deeply marked by its past, as it is being reshaped by the unprecedented torrent of economic, social, cultural, and technological forces that are washing over its future.
这也是为什么在学习中国语言、历史、政治、经济和文化长达40多年后，我毅然决然地在牛津大学开展了新的项目，专门研究“习近平的世界观”。我很明白这将不是一个静态的过程。而将是一个动态的、不断发展变化的过程。虽然一股前所未有的经济、社会、文化和科技的激流正在改变中国的未来，但中国的历史同样也是这个国家未来走向的最重要的影响力之一。
Over the last 40 years I have engaged China as a student, bureaucrat, diplomat, Member of Parliament, foreign minister, and prime minister. And now as the President of an American think tank, part of a venerable institution, the Asia Society, which has been engaging China since the earliest days of the People’s Republic in 1956. Understanding China is a lifelong journey.
在过去的40多年中，我曾以学生、官僚、外交官、国会议员、外交部长和总理的身份去了解中国；而现在，我又作为亚洲协会政策研究院主席来接触中国（亚洲协会从1956年就开始研究和了解中国）。
对我而言，了解和学习中国是一个毕生的旅程。
For those of you who would become the next generation of American military leaders, it must be your lifelong journey as well. I argue that there will be no more important part of your professional skill-craft than to understand how Chinese leaders think, how they perceive the world, and how the world should most productively engage them. That applies also to your country’s future political leadership, corporate leadership, and every branch of its military. So I encourage you in your mission.
对于将要成为美国下一代的军事领导人的你们而言，这也必会成为你们一生的旅程。
我认为，对于你们的专业培养和方略学习而言，没有什么比去了解中国领导人思想、他们是如何看待世界的、以及去探索如何更有效地与他们接触更重要的了。这些对于贵国未来的政治领导、企业领导以及军队领导都同样适用。因此，我鼓励大家在你们未来的任务中，不断努力去探索学习中国。

DEFINING XI JINPING’S CHINA
定义习近平治下的中国
Xi’s Political Authority
习近平的政治权威
The beginning of wisdom in understanding China’s view of the world is to understand China’s view of the future of its own country—its politics, its economics, its society. Xi Jinping lies at the apex of the Chinese political system. But his influence now permeates every level. Five years ago, I wrote that Xi would be China’s most powerful leader since Deng. I was wrong. He’s now China’s most powerful leader since Mao. We see this at multiple levels. The anti-corruption campaign he’s wielded across the Party has not only helped him “clean up” the country’s almost industrial levels of corruption. It has also afforded the additional benefit of “cleaning up” all of Xi Jinping’s political opponents on the way through.
在我看来，了解中国的智慧，应该始于从中国的角度，来了解中国对于自身政治、经济和社会的未来的看法 。虽然习近平处于中国政治系统的最高位，但是他如今的影响力渗透到整个社会的各个阶层和每个角落。五年前，我曾写过，习近平将会是邓小平以来中国最强大的领导人。可是我错了。现在看来，习近平可谓是从毛泽东以来中国最强领导人。我们可以从各个层面看到这一点。他在全党内掀起的反腐倡廉运动不仅帮助他肃清政府体制内的腐败，同时也帮助他清除了政治对手。
It’s a formidable list：
这里是一个令人生畏的名单：
· Bo Xilai, Politburo member and Party Secretary of Chongqing;
· 薄熙来，原中共中央政治局委员、中共重庆市委书记；
· Zhou Yongkang, Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the internal security apparatus;
· 周永康，原中共中央政治局常委、政法委书记；
· Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission;
· 徐才厚，原中央军事委员会副主席；
· Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission;
· 郭伯雄，原中央军事委员会副主席；
· Ling Jihua, former Chief of the General Office of the CPC and Chief of Staff to Hu Jintao;
· 令计划， 原中共中央办公厅主任；
· Sun Zhengcai, Politburo member and another Party Secretary from Chongqing;
· 孙政才，原中共中央委员，中共重庆市委书记；
· And just prior to the 19th Party Congress, General Fang Fenghui, Chief of the Joint Staffs, and General Zhang Yang, Director of the PLA Political Work Department, who recently committed suicide.
· 以及在19大之前落马的原中国人民解放军上将、中央军委联合参谋部参谋长房峰辉，和不久前自杀的原中国人民解放军上将、中央军委政治工作部主任张阳。
None of this is for the faint-hearted. It says much about the inherent nature of a Chinese political system, which has rarely managed leadership transitions smoothly. But it also points to the political skill-craft of Xi Jinping himself.
显而易见，了解和参与中国政治需要胆量。
从中我们也可以看到中国政治体制的本质— 权力交接暗潮汹涌。
同时，我们从中也可以看出习近平政治手腕的强硬。
Xi Jinping is no political neophyte. He has grown up in Chinese party politics as conducted at the highest levels. Through his father, Xi Zhongxun, he has been on both the winning side and the losing side of the many bloody battles that have been fought within the Chinese Communist Party since the days of the Cultural Revolution half a century ago.
习近平从来都不是政治新手。他自小长于政治世家，对于中国高层政治，耳濡目染。 虽然出身红二代，但他的父亲，中共元老习仲勋，在文革期间，被牵扯进血腥的政治案件中，举家受到牵连。
There is little that Xi Jinping hasn’t seen with his own eyes on the deepest internal workings of the Party. He has been through a “masterclass” of not only how to survive it, but also on how to prevail within it. For these reasons, he has proven himself to be the most formidable politician of his age. He has succeeded in pre-empting, outflanking, outmaneuvering, and then removing each of his political adversaries. The polite term for this is power consolidation. In that, he has certainly succeeded.
对于中国共产党的内部斗争，习近平司空见惯。他的亲身经历如“大师课”般将其锻炼，不仅教会了他如何在党内生存，也教会了他如何在政治斗争中获胜。
正因为此，他向世人证明了，他是这一代最强政治家 —— 在一系列的政治斗争中，他遍用三十六计，一个个消灭政治对手，巩固政治权力和地位，大获全胜。
The external manifestations of this are seen in the decision, now endorsed by the 19th Party Congress and the 13th National People’s Congress, held this week, to formally enshrine “Xi Jinping Thought” as part of the Chinese constitution. For Xi Jinping’s predecessors, Deng, Jiang and Hu, this privilege was only accorded them after they had formally left the political stage. In Xi Jinping’s case, it occurs near the beginning of what is likely to be a long political career.
这种胜利的外在表现，便是十九大习近平核心地位的确认，和十三届全国人大通过的《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》，将习近平思想写入宪法等等 —— 对于习近平之前的中共领导人而言，如此待遇往往在他们正式离开政治舞台后才享有。对于习近平而言，这将会是他漫长政治生涯的开端。
A further manifestation of Xi Jinping’s extraordinary political power has been the concentration of the policy machinery of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi now chairs six top-level “leading small groups” as well as a number of central committees and commissions covering every major area of policy.
习近平非凡政治力量的进一步体现是中国共产党政策机构的高度集中。习近平现在兼任六个领导小组的组长，以及多个中央委员会的领导人。

A third expression of Xi’s power has been the selection of candidates for the seven man standing committee of the politburo, the 20-person wider politburo, and the 209 member central committee. There’s been some debate among China analysts as to the degree to which these ranks are now filled with Xi loyalists. My argument is simple：it is a much more accommodating and comfortable set of appointments from Xi Jinping’s personal perspective than what he inherited from the 18th Party Congress.
习近平权力的第三个表现，可以从中共中央政治局常委、委员2，以及中共中央委员会的名单中看出。现在很多中国政治分析家都在争论，在这些人中到底有多少习近平的忠实追随者。我的论点很简单：对习近平而言，目前的人事安排，远比18大后他刚接手时，让他感觉更得心应手。
Furthermore, his ability to prevail on critical personnel selection is underlined by the impending appointment of his close friend and colleague Wang Qishan as Chinese Vice President. Wang Qishan himself has passed the retirement age, but this has proven to be no obstacle to retaining him as an ex-officio member of the politburo standing committee, as reflected in the footage carried yesterday by the Chinese media of the opening sessions of the National People’s Congress. And it is Wang Qishan who will be entrusted by Xi with working level responsibility for the vast complexity that is now the US-China relationship.
此外，他的亲密朋友兼同事王岐山被任命为中共国家副主席，这更加突显了习近平在关键岗位上任贤选能的卓越能力。这一决定也体现了习近平对王岐山在解决当前中美关系复杂问题能力上的充分信任。

A fifth manifestation of Xi Jinping’s accumulation of unchallenged personal power has been the decision to remove the provision of the 1982 Chinese State Constitution, which imposed term limits of two five-year terms on those appointed to the Chinese presidency. Xi Jinping is now 64 years old. He will be 69 by the expiration of his second term as President, General Secretary of the Party, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Given his own family’s longevity（his father lived to 88, and his mother is still alive at 91）, as well as the general longevity of China’s most senior political leaders, it is prudent for us to assume that Xi Jinping, in one form or another, will remain China’s paramount leader through the 2020’s and into the following decade.
习近平不容置疑的个人权力的第五个表现在其成功取消了1982年《中华人民共和国宪法》中规定国家主席连任不得超过两届的限制。现年64岁的习近平在作为国家主席、中共中央总书记以及中央军委主席第二任期结束后将会是69岁。鉴于他家族长寿的特性（习近平的父亲享年88岁、母亲现年92岁），以及中国政治领导人普遍长寿的本质，我们可以谨慎地认为习近平，无论以哪种方式，会在2020年代以及接下来的十年中一直担任中国的最高领导人。
He therefore begins to loom large as a dominant figure not just in Chinese history, but on world history, in the twenty-first century. It will be on his watch that China finally becomes the largest economy in the world, or at least returned to that status, which it last held during the Qing dynasty.
他的个人形象不仅在中国的历史上，同时也在21世纪的世界历史上赫然耸立。
中国终有一天会在习近平治下成为世界上最大经济体，或者至少可以说是重回康乾盛世。
Finally, there is the personality of Xi Jinping himself as a source of political authority. For those who have met him and had conversations with him, he has a strong intellect, a deep sense of his country’s and the world’s history, and a deeply defined worldview of where he wants to lead his country. Xi Jinping is no accidental president. It’s as if he has been planning for this all his life.
最后，习近平本身的性格品质也是他政治权威的根源之一。那些曾经见过他或与他交谈过的人都认为，习近平才智过人，对中国和世界历史有着深刻见解，其深刻世界观明确清晰地指引其向何处领导中国。习近平成为中国领袖绝非偶然。他生而为此。

It has been a lifetime’s accumulation of the intellectual software, combined with the political hardware of raw politics, which form the essential qualities of high political leadership in countries such as China. For the rest of the world, Xi Jinping represents a formidable partner, competitor or adversary, depending on the paths that are chosen in the future.
毕生知识“软件”的积累，结合政治系统“硬件”条件，构成了如中国般国家高级政治领导的基本才能和品质。
对世界其他国家而言，取决于其各自未来的选择，习近平可以是一个令人生畏的合作者、竞争者、或是对手。
There are those within the Chinese political system who have opposed this large-scale accumulation of personal power in the hands of Xi Jinping alone, mindful of the lessons from Mao. The decision, in particular, to alter the term-limits concerning the Chinese presidency has been of great symbolic significance within the Chinese domestic debate. State censorship was immediately applied to any discussion of the subject across China’s often unruly social media. The People’s Daily, in a surprisingly defensive editorial last week, was at pains to point out that the changes to term limits for the Chinese presidency simply brought China’s state constitution into line with the Party constitution, which imposed no term limits on the positions of General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Even more defensively, the People’s Daily was at equal pains to point out that these constitutional changes did not signify “leadership for life”.
当然，毛泽东时代的教训，也让中国的政治体系内的一些人记忆犹新，因此也对习近平个人权力的高度集中持保留意见。
取消“国家主席连任不得超过两届”的限制是这场辩论赛的重要话题。中国的审查机构开始大规模的监管社会媒体的有关言论。人民日报，在上周的一篇社论中出人意料地提到，修改国家主席任期制度其实是将宪法的内容和党章内不对中共中央总书记和中央军委主席加任期限制的内容进行统一。人民日报的社论还强调，对宪法的修改并不意味着“领导干部职务终身制”。
For Xi’s continuing opponents within the system, what we might describe as “a silent minority”, this has created a central, symbolic target for any resentments they may hold against Xi Jinping’s leadership. It would be deeply analytically flawed to conclude that these individuals have any real prospect of pushing back against the Xi Jinping political juggernaut in the foreseeable future. But what these constitutional changes have done is to make Xi potentially vulnerable to any single, large-scale adverse event in the future. If you have become, in effect, “Chairman of Everything”, then it is easy for your political opponents to hold you responsible for anything and everything that could go wrong, whether you happen to be responsible for it or not.
对于党内那些一直反对习近平的“沉默的少数派”而言，无论他们是从哪方面对习近平的领导有不满，这都是他们攻击的最主要目标。然而，如果轻易得出“这些人很有可能在可预测的未来推翻习近平政权”这样的结论，那就是我们分析上的失误了。但是，如此修宪，的确可能使得习近平，在面对未来可能发生的大规模不利事件时，难辞其咎。如果一个人成为了“万能主席”，对于他的政敌或异见人士来说，无论他是否应该对某一个问题负责，他们都能轻易地把任何错误归咎到他的身上。
This could include any profound miscalculation, or unintended consequence, arising from contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Chinese debt crisis, or large-scale social disruption arising from unmanageable air pollution or a collapse in employment through a loss of competitiveness, large-scale automation or artificial intelligence.
这些可能误算或意外后果，可能来自朝鲜半岛、台湾问题、南海问题、或中国债务危机，也可能来自由于难以管理的环境污染问题，或大规模自动化和人工智能造成的就业问题，所引发的社会动荡。

However, militating against any of the above, and the “tipping points” which each could represent, is Xi Jinping’s seemingly absolute command of the security and intelligence apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party and the state. Xi Jinping loyalists have been placed in command of all sensitive positions across the security establishment. The People’s Armed Police have now been placed firmly under party control rather than under the control of the state. And then there is the new technological sophistication of the domestic security apparatus right across the country—an apparatus which now employs more people than the PLA.
然而，对于如上问题或其代表的可能“引爆点”，习近平对于党和国家的安全和情报机构的全面掌控都能有效管控。习近平的人已经遍布中国国家安全网的各个重要位置。中国武警部队也被置于中国共产党的绝对领导之下。而且，中国的国安设备遍布全国，国安人员可能多过解放军。至少中国国内的维稳经费是不亚于军费开支的。
We should never forget that the Chinese Communist Party is a revolutionary party which makes no bones about the fact that it obtained power through the barrel of a gun, and will sustain power through the barrel of a gun if necessary. We should not have any dewy-eyed sentimentality about any of this. It’s a simple fact that this is what the Chinese system is like.
我们永远不应该忘记，中国共产党是一个革命党。中国共产党不仅坚信枪杆子里出政权，而且必要时也可以通过枪杆子来维持政权。对此我们不必矫情。要明白这只是中国政治体系的本质特点之一而已。

Xi Jinping’s View of the Party
习近平的党观
Apart from the sheer construction of personal power within the Chinese political system, how does Xi Jinping see the future evolution of China’s political structure? Here again, we’ve reached something of a tipping point in the evolution of Chinese politics since the return of Deng Xiaoping at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in November 1978.
除了在党内建构与巩固个人权力之外，习近平是如何看待中国政治体制未来演变的呢？在此我们要再次提到邓小平在1978年11月的十一届三中全会回归后的中国政治转折。
There has long been a tacit assumption, at least across much of the collectives west, over the last 40 years, that China, step-by-step, was embracing the global liberal capitalist project. Certainly, there was a view that Deng Xiaoping’s program of “reform and opening” would liberalise the Chinese economy with a greater role for market principles and a lesser role for the Chinese state in the economy.
西方社会的多数人，都假定了中国这40年来，逐渐皈依了全球资本主义体系。
当然，很多人也认为，邓小平的“改革开放”一定程度上解放了中国经济，开始重视和发挥市场在资源配置中的作用，减少了国家对经济的掌控。
A parallel assumption has been that over time, this would produce liberal democratic forces across the country which would gradually reduce the authoritarian powers of the Chinese Communist Party, create a greater plurality of political voices within the country, and in time involve something not dissimilar to a Singaporean-style “guided democracy”, albeit it on a grand scale. Despite the global wake-up call that was Tiananmen in 1989, by and large this continued to be the underlying view across the west, always misguided in my view, that China, through many twists and turns, was still broadly on track to create a more liberal political system, if not to create any form of classical western liberal democracy.
与此同时，西方社会也假定了，改革开放鼓励自由民主，从而会削弱中国共产党的专制力量、创造一个更多元化的政治环境 —— 然后随着时间的推进，中国会逐渐发展成为一个大规模的、新加坡式的“可控民主”体制。
尽管八九年的天安门算是当头棒喝，西方社会依然假定，即使中国不转型成一个典型的西方自由民主国家，也正在向一个大体上更加自由的政治体系发展。这一观点，在我看来是极具误导性的。

Many scholars failed to pay attention to the internal debates within the Party in the late 1990s, where internal consideration was indeed given to the long-term transformation of the Communist Party into a western-style social democratic party as part of a more pluralist political system. The Chinese were mindful of what happened with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also saw the political transformations of what was unfolding across Eastern and Central Europe. Study groups were commissioned. Intense discussions held. They even included certain trusted foreigners at the time. I remember participating in some of them myself. Just as I remember my Chinese colleagues telling me in 2001-2 that China had concluded this debate, there would be no systemic change, and China would continue to be a one-party state. It would certainly be a less authoritarian state than the sort of totalitarianism we had seen during the rule of Mao Zedong. But the revolutionary party would remain.
许多学者都忽视了1990年代末，中国共产党党内就创造多元化的政治系统，进行的关于中国共产党是否应该向西方民主化党派转型的辩论。中国人对90年代初苏联的解体都十分敏感，他们同时间见证了中欧和东欧国家进行的民主化转型。许多研究小组受到委托，就此问题进行了激烈辩论。一些受信任的外国学者也参与其中，我本人也曾参加到这些讨论中去。我还记得，我中国的同僚曾在2001-2002年间告诉我，中国不会进行任何系统性的改变，而会维持一党制的政治制度的结论已经得出。当然，和毛泽东时代的集权主义相比，中国的政治系统不会那么的专制。但是中国的革命政党会保持下去。
The reasons were simple. The Party’s own institutional interests are in its long-term survival：after all, they had won the revolution, so in their own Leninist worldview why on earth should they voluntarily yield power to others? But there was a second view as well. They also believed that China could never become a global great power in the absence of the Party’s strong central leadership. And that in the absence of such leadership, China would simply dissipate into the divided bickering camps that had often plagued the country throughout its history. The Communist Party would continue, therefore, as an unapologetically Leninist party for the future.
理由很简单。对于中国共产党而言，它最根本的利益兴趣点是在于如何长久的存活下去：毕竟他们赢得了革命胜利，所以在他们自己的列宁主义世界观里，为什么要自愿向别人屈服呢？除此之外，还有第二个原因。他们认为，如果没有共产党强有力的中央集权，中国不可能成为世界强国；如果没有共产党强有力的领导，党内很快就会分裂成几个争论不休的小阵营 —— 纵观中国历史，这样的小阵营只会为整个国家带来麻烦。因此，中国共产党在未来还是会当之无愧地保持它列宁主义社会革命党的本质。
To be fair to Xi Jinping, it should be noted for the historical record that these internal debates were concluded a decade before Xi’s rise to power. The rise of Xi Jinping should not be interpreted simplistically as the sudden triumph of authoritarianism over democracy for the future of China’s domestic political system. That debate was already over. Rather it should be seen as a definition of the particular form of authoritarianism that China’s new leadership now seeks to entrench.
用公平一些的眼光来看，我们应该注意到这些辩论和得出的结论已经是习近平上任前十多年的事情了。习近平的崛起并不简单意味着专制独裁主义在中国的政治体系里胜过了民主。这个争论早在十多年前就结束了。相反，它应该被看作是中国新一届领导层巩固专制主义的新形式。
I see this emerging political system as having three defining characteristics. First, the unapologetic assertion of the power, prestige and prerogatives of the Party apparatus over the administrative machinery of the state. In previous decades, the role of the Party apparatus had shrunk to a more narrowly defined, ideological role. The powers of detailed policy decision-making had gradually migrated to the institutions of state council. This indeed had been a signature reform under Premier Zhu Rongji.
我认为这种新兴的政治体系有三个明确的特点。第一，党的权力、权威和声望不容置疑地高于国家行政体制。在过去的几十年中，党机构的角色地位被狭义地局限于意识形态方面。而详细政策的决策权逐渐向国务院机构转移 —— 这是朱镕基总理任内的重要改革之一。

That is no longer the case. Xi Jinping has realised that if you remove the Party as an institution from continued structural relevance to the country’s real policy decision-making process, the party over time would literally fade away. As a person who believes deeply not just in the Party’s history, but also the Party’s future, Xi has not been prepared to stand idly by while that happened. Xi has now intervened decisively to reverse this trend.
但现在的情况不再如此。习近平意识到，如果将党组织机构结构性地从国家政策决议过程中移除，那么党的地位就会逐渐边缘化，直到消失。习近平充分相信党的历史和未来。他绝对不会袖手旁观。他已经开始果断干预、扭转这一趋势。
A second defining feature of this “new authoritarian” period is the role of political ideology over pragmatic policy. For the previous forty years, we’ve been told that China’s governing ideology was “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. As the decades rolled by, at least in the economy, there was much less “socialism” than there were “Chinese characteristics”. In this sense, “Chinese characteristics” became the accepted domestic political euphemism for the good old capitalism.
“新权威主义”时代的第二个定义性特征是政治意识形态的地位超过了实用主义政策。在过去的40年中，我们一直被告知中国的执政理念是“有中国特色的社会主义道路”。几十年过去了，至少在经济领域我们可以看到“社会主义”比“中国特色”少得多。从这个意义上来说，在中国，“中国特色”已经成为资本主义的委婉说辞了。
Few people seemed to have understood that a core part of Xi Jinping’s intellectual make up is that he is a Marxist dialectician. This derives from the Hegelian principles of “thesis, antithesis and synthesis”. Or in Chinese Maoist terms：“Contradictions among the people”. This forms a deep part of Xi Jinping’s intellectual software. Indeed the importance, which Xi attaches to this as an intellectual methodology that led him to conduct two formal Politburo study sessions on both “historical materialism” and “dialectical materialism” in 2013 and 2015 respectively. As a dialectician, Xi Jinping is acutely conscious of the new social, economic and political forces being created by China’s “neo-liberal” economic transformation. He would also understand intuitively the challenges which these new forces would, over time, represent to the party’s continuing Leninist hold on power.
似乎很少有人真正看到习近平智慧的核心组成部分是来源于他作为马克思主义辩证学者的身份。这源于黑格尔“‘正反合’形式”的辩证法；也来源于毛泽东的“人民内部的矛盾”。两者结合形成了习近平知识“软件”的核心部分。2013年和2015年，习近平两次组织中央政治局进行关于“历史唯物主义”和“辩证唯物主义”的集体学习，也充分展现了习近平对这一方法论的重视。作为一个辩证学家，习近平也敏锐地意识到中国“新自由主义”经济转型所造成的新的社会、经济和政治力量。同时，他也会直观地了解到这些新势力，随着时间的推移，将对未来列宁主义党继续执政带来的挑战。

Both he and the rest of the central leadership have read development economics. They are not deaf and dumb. They know what the international literature says：that demands for political liberalisation almost universally arise once per capita income passes a certain threshold. They are therefore deeply aware of the profound “contradiction” which exists between China’s national development priority of escaping the “middle income trap” on the one hand, and unleashing parallel demands for political liberalisation once incomes continue to rise on the other.
习近平和其余的中央领导层都曾学习过发展经济学。他们都聪明过人，当然可以理解：一旦人均收入超过一定的界限，人们对政治自由化的要求就会普遍出现。因此，这些领导人们也都深刻地意识到中国摆脱“中等收入陷阱”的国家发展重点与持续的收入增长将会造成对政治自由化的需求之间的矛盾。

Xi Jinping’s response to this dilemma has been a reassertion of ideology. This has meant a reassertion of Marxist-Leninist ideology. And a new prominence accorded to ideological education across the entire Chinese system. But it’s more sophisticated than a simple uni-dimensional ideological response. At least since the 2008 Olympics, which pre-dated Xi’s ascendency, Chinese nationalism has also become a parallel mainstay in China’s broader ideological formation. This has continued and expanded under Xi Jinping. And it has been augmented by an infinitely more sophisticated propaganda apparatus across the country, which now fuses the imagery of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese nation into a combined Chinese contemporary political consciousness.
习近平对这一左右为难的局面做出的回应，是对中共意识形态的再次强调。这不仅意味着对马克思列宁主义指导思想地位的再次确认，也是中国思想教育体制的新突破。不过这比单维度的意识形态回应要复杂得多。至少自习近平上任前的2008年奥运会开幕以来，中国民族主义已经成为中国更广泛的意识形态形成的重要支柱。这一点在习近平治下继续扩大发展。而且，纵横中国的那些富有经验的中央宣传机构，也通过将中国共产党和中华民族的形象融入中国当代政治意识中，从而加深对意识形态的方面的重申。

On top of this, we’ve also seen a rehabilitation of Chinese Confucianism as part of the restoration of Chinese historical narratives on, and the continuing resonance of, China’s “unique” national political forms. According to the official line, this historical, authoritarian, hierarchical continuity is what has differentiated China from the rest of the world. This Chinese “neo-Confucianism” is regarded by the party as a comfortable historical accompaniment to the current imperatives for a strong, modern Chinese state, necessary to manage the complex processes of the “Great Chinese Renaissance” of the future.
除此之外，我们也看到中国儒学的复兴是中国历史叙述重建，以及与中国“独特”国家政治形态持续共鸣的一部分。根据官方的说法，这种历史性的，专制的，等级制度的连续性是中国与世界其他地区最大的区别。“新儒学”的兴起，对中国共产党而言，是对当今中国成为一个强大的现代化国家最好的历史印证和结合，也是中国“伟大民族复兴”复杂过程中的必要因素。

The short-hand form of the political narrative is simple：China’s historical greatness, across its dynastic histories, lay in a strong, authoritarian hierarchical Confucian state. By corollary, China’s historical greatness has never been a product of Western liberal democracy. By further corollary, China’s future national greatness will lie not in any adaptation of Western political forms, but instead through the modern adaptation of its own indigenous political legacy in the form of a Confucian, communist state.
简而言之：纵观中国的朝代历史，其每每强盛都是以一个强大的、专制的、等级制度的、以儒学治国为基础的。换句话说，中国历史上的每一次盛大从来都不是西方自由民主的产物。不难推断，中国未来的国家强盛，也不会依赖于西方的政治形式，而在于传统文化与共产主义在中国的结合。

Xi’s Jinping’s View of the Economy
习近平的经济观
A third characteristic of China’s “new authoritarianism”, although less clear than the first and second, is what is now emerging in the future direction of China’s economic program. We are all familiar with Deng Xiaoping’s famous axiom that “it doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, so long as it catches mice”. Just as we are familiar with his other exhortation, “it is indeed glorious to be rich”. These were followed by later exhortations by China’s apparatchik class to leave government service（xiahai）and go out into the world（zouchuqu）. These simple axioms, as opposed to complex statements of ideology, provided the underlying guidance for the subsequent two generations of Chinese entrepreneurs, both at home and abroad.
中国“新权威主义”的第三个特点，尽管不如前两个明显，就是中国经济的未来走向。我们都很熟悉邓小平的“白猫黑猫论”，也同样熟悉他的另一句名言“致富光荣”；以及后来流行的“下海”和“走出去”。这些与有关意识形态的长篇大论相反的简单语言，对接下来两代的在中国和海外的企业家们提供了指导性的意见。
In policy terms, China’s first phase of economic reform（1978-2012）was characterised by small-scale, local family enterprises, involved in light industry; low-wage, labour-intensive manufacturing for export; combined with high-level, state investment in public infrastructure, including telecommunications, broadband, road, rail, port, power generation, transmission and distribution.
从政策的角度来看，中国第一阶段的经济改革（1978-2012）主要类型包括小规模的地方家族企业、轻工业；低薪、劳动力密集型的出口制造业；以及包括电信、宽带、公路、铁路、港口、发电、输电和配电等高水平国家投资的公共基础设施建设。
In early 2013, at the 3rd plenum of the 18th Central Committee, Xi Jinping released a new blueprint for the second phase of China’s economic reform program, or what was ominously called “The Decision”, or more elegantly China’s “New Economic Model”. Its defining characteristics were a new emphasis on domestic consumption market rather than exports as the principal driver of future economic growth; the explosion of China’s private sector at the expense of the overall market share of China’s state owned enterprises, which were to be constrained to certain, critical strategic industry sectors; the flourishing of the services sector, particularly through the agency of digital commerce; “leapfrogging” the West in critical new technology sectors, including biotechnology, and artificial intelligence; and all within the new framework of environmentally sustainable development, particularly air pollution and climate change.
2013年初，习近平在十八届三中全会上发表了有关深化改革的第二阶段的蓝图，通常被称为《决定》，或中国的“新经济模式”。《决定》最主要的特点就是强调了市场的重要性，并努力实现从出口和投资驱动的经济到消费型经济的转型；除了部分战略行业，限制国有企业的整体市场份额，以鼓励私有企业蓬勃发展；推进电子商务等服务业的有序开放；促进包括生物技术和人工智能在内的新科技产业的发展；以及一切发展都要以重视空气污染和气候变化的环境可持续发展为前提。

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It’s important to track over the last five years what progress, and regress has occurred across the 60 specific reform measures articulated in the decision of March 2013. The core organising principle across the reform program was that “the market would play the decisive role” across China’s economic system. The Asia Society Policy Institute, of which I am President, in collaboration with the Rhodium Group, has been producing over the last six months the “China Economic Dashboard”, which looks in detail at the ten core barometers of economic change. What we have concluded is that China has made progress in two of these. First, in innovation policy, where China has made measurable strides, both in policy direction but more critically, in defiance of the usual skepticism about China’s capacity to innovate, in actual economic performance. Second, we also measured progress in Chinese environmental reforms, in particular the reduction in the PMI measures on air pollution across China’s major cities over the last two years. However, in five of ten areas, we’ve seen China at best marking time：investment, trade, finance, SOE and land reform. And finally, in fiscal policy, competition policy and labour reform, we see evidence of China sliding backwards against the reform direction it set for itself five years ago. Each of these are the subject of considerable debate across the Chinese economic analytical community, particularly given the perennial problems we all face with data. Nonetheless, only the bravest official commentators in China could now point to 2013-18 as a path-breaking period of economic reform. It has at best been slow.
重要的是，要去跟踪调查2013年11月以来的五年中，十八届三中全会《决定》中列出的“全面改革60条”，有多少项被启动，又有多少不进反退。整个改革计划的核心原则是“使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用”。亚洲协会政策研究院通过与荣鼎集团合作，推出“中国经济仪表板”，跟踪观察中国十项核心经济变化，并在“中国经济仪表板”上制作“晴雨表” 。初步结论现实中国在两个领域取得进展。首先，在创新政策方面，中国已经在政策方向上取得了可观的进展，但更为关键的是，中国开始摒弃对中国在经济领域创新能力的怀疑态度。其次，我们还测量了中国环境改革的进展情况，特别是过去两年中国主要城市空气污染措施的减少情况。然而，在这十项领域中，至少在投资、贸易、金融、国有企业和土地改革这五个方面，中国都在原地踏步。最后，在财政政策、竞争政策和劳动力改革方面，我们看到了中国在五年前为自己设定的改革方向目标上倒退的证据。尤其是考虑到我们所有人面临的长期问题，这些都是中国经济分析界广泛讨论的话题 。现而今，在中国，鲜有对于“全面改革60条”的积极报道，因为2013 – 2018年至多是中国经济改革的缓慢前行期。

This brings into sharp relief the content of the government work report on the economy delivered at the National People’s Congress in Beijing in March 2018. Once again, precisely five years down the track from the original documents, the analytical community will pore over the entrails to analyse whether the spirit of market-based reforms continues to flourish for the future. Or whether it has begun to fade amidst a more general Chinese political and ideological redirection to the left. Or just as problematically, for economic reform to die at the implementation level because of confusing political and policy signals from the centre, meaning that it is much safer to just keep your head down. Or because there are limited local incentives, either personal or institutional, to actively prosecute reform which inevitably generates local conflict with deeply entrenched vested interests. Or, more likely, an unholy cocktail of the above, collectively reinforcing a natural predisposition towards bureaucratic inertia.
这种情况使得将要在2018年3月举行的人民代表大会发表的经济报告内容显得尤为重要。自《决定》发表的整整五年后，所有的分析团队都会仔细研究这次经济报告的内容，从而去分析市场经济改革的精神是否会在未来持续蓬勃发展；或者这一精神是否会随着中国政治和意识形态从新向着左派开始发展而逐渐消失；或者经济改革政策，由于中央令人混淆的政治、政策指示，在实施阶段就已经开始走下坡路；又或者由于地方奖励机制的有限，无论是个人还是机构，都无法积极事实改革，从而不可避免地在当地造成利益集团的内部冲突；再或者，以上种种原因，很有可能造成了官僚主义作风的倾向。
Certainly those at the centre of China’s economic reform team, including Wang Qishan, Liu He and Wang Yang, understand the absolute imperatives of implementing this next round of economic reform. They know from bitter experience that to stand still is in fact to go backwards. And they understand in particular that the only source of employment growth in China’s economy over the last five years has come from the private sector, not SOEs, as China each year is required to absorb 20 million new workers into its labour force.
当然，包括王岐山、刘鹤、汪洋在内的中央财经领导小组的领导层，都充分意识到了深化改革的必要性。他们从过去痛苦的经历中知道，逆水行舟，不进则退。并且，他们也清楚地认识到，中国十三亿人口每年就要新增两千万个劳动力，在过去五年内，中国经济中唯一促进就业率增长的就是私有企业，并非国有企业。
Nonetheless, there have been worrying signs. First, the role of Party secretaries within private firms now seems to have been enhanced. Second, there is now an open debate in China as to whether the state should acquire equity within China’s most successful private firms in order to secure broad representation and greater political influence over these companies’ future direction. And third, in the wake of the anti-corruption campaign and other compliance irregularities, we now see a number of prominent Chinese private firms in real political difficulty, and in one case, Anbang, the temporary “assumption of state control” of the company’s assets after its Chairman and CEO was taken into custody.
尽管如此，还有其他令人担忧的迹象。首先，私有企业中的党委书记的角色似乎得到加强。其次，中国现在正在就国家是否应该获得中国成功私营公司的股权，以确保广泛代表性和对这些公司未来方向的更大政治影响力这一问题进行公开辩论。第三，随着反腐运动和一系列纠察违规行为的发生，我们可以看到一些中国民营企业正处于政治困境当中，比如，在安邦集团的董事长涉嫌经济犯罪被拘留后，中国保监会对安邦集团实施暂时接管。

Compounding all of the above is still a continuing lack of truly independent commercial courts and arbitration mechanisms. The complication this creates is whether this leads over time to a private capital strike, or a flight of private capital of the type we have seen over the last several years, resulting in a re-imposition of formal capital controls by the state.
如上种种又反应出中国值得信赖的独立的商业法庭和仲裁机制的缺失。这便让人忧心是否今后会出现私有资本罢工、或私有资本外流的现象，从而导致国家重新实行资本管制的问题。

So on the future direction of China’s economy, the jury is still out. Have we also reached a new “tipping point”, as we appear to have done in Chinese politics? Or will this be a more sophisticated Chinese play, consistent with one of the deeper aphorisms of Chinese politics, that “in order to go right on the economy, you must go left on politics” in order to sustain to internal “balance” of the system? The next 12 months with China’s new economic team will be critical.
中国经济的未来走向，尚无定论。但这是否意味着，在此问题上，已经出现一个新的“临界点”？又或者，这是否是中国为了保持内部系统平衡而选择的“政左经右”模式？无论如何，接下来的12个月对中央财经领导小组而言尤为重要。

CHINA’S “WORLDVIEW” UNDER XI JINPING
习近平治下的中国世界观
Seven Core Priorities
七个优先核心
There is always a danger facing foreign policy and security policy specialists when they seek to understand and define the capabilities, strategy and worldview of other states. There is always a temptation, given the analytical disciplines we represent, to see these “external” manifestations of state behaviour in the international realm as independent phenomena. Whereas the reality is that any country’s worldview is as much the product of its domestic politics, economics, culture and historiography as it is the product of the number of guns, tanks and bullets held by ourselves, and by those around us.
对于外交政策和安全政策研究专家而言，当他们试图去了解其他国家的能力、策略和世界观时，同时也面临着一些危险和挑战。考虑到我们常用的分析手段，我们总不自觉地认为一个国家行为在世界领域中的外在表现是独立的现象，而与其国内事务无关。然而，事实上，一个国家的世界观是其国内政治、经济、文化和历史的共同产物，正如国家的世界观也是一个国家本身和其他国家硬实力（枪支、坦克、子弹）的共同产物。
That’s why I’ve sought to emphasise in this presentation so far the domestic drivers that underpin China’s emerging worldview. It’s important to bear in mind that those who ultimately shape Chinese strategy, like American strategy, are those who are equally engaged in the domestic affairs of their nations. There is no longer a clinical distinction between the foreign and domestic, the international and the national. Therefore understanding the domestic imperatives of China’s leadership is the beginning of wisdom in understanding the emerging patterns of China’s foreign and security policy behaviour.
这也是为什么我在本次演讲中不断强调中国内政驱动其世界观发展的因素。我们需要牢记，和美国策略制定一样，那些决策中国国际策略的人，在国内政治中受着也有着同样的影响。对于国内和国外，内政与外交的理解不应该被区别开。因此，理解中国领导层的国内政策，是理解中国外交和安全政策的开端。

The Party
中国共产党
China’s emerging worldview, in my own estimation, is best understood as a set of seven concentric circles. The first concentric circle is the Chinese Communist Party itself and its overriding interest to remain in power. This Leninist reality should never be forgotten. It is radically different from the worldview of Western political parties, who while always determined to remain in electoral power while they possibly can, also understand there is a natural ebb and flow in our national political discourse, intermediated by the electoral process.
在我看来，中国新兴的世界观，可以被理解成七个同心圆。第一个便是中国共产党和它持续领导中国的强烈意愿。这个列宁主义的事实需要被牢记。这一点和西方政党的世界观完全不同，西方政党在尽可能保持选举权的同时，也理解在选举过程中，每个政党的政治话语权都会有起有落。
National Unity
国家统一
The second concentric circle, in terms of the core interests of the Chinese leadership, is the unity of the motherland. This may seem a hackneyed phrase in the West. But it remains of vital concern in Beijing, both as a question of national security on the one hand, and a question of enduring political legitimacy on the other. From Beijing’s perspective, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Taiwan represent a core set of security interests. Each within itself represents a confluence of external and internal security factors. Tibet is a central factor in Chinese perceptions of its strategic relationship with India. Xinjiang represents China’s gateway to what it perceives to be an increasingly hostile Islamic world, reinforced by concerns about its own, home-grown Islamic separatist movement. Inner Mongolia, despite the resolution of the common border with Russia decades ago, represents a continuing source of strategic anxiety between China and Russia. Taiwan, long seen as an American aircraft carrier in the Pacific, represents in the Chinese strategic mind a grand blocking device against China’s national aspirations for a more controlled, and therefore more secure maritime frontier, as well as an impediment to the ultimate political holy grail of national re-unification. These “internal” security challenges will always remain China’s core security challenges, apart, of course, from the security of the Party itself.
就中国领导层的核心利益而言，第二个同心圆是国家的统一。在西方看来这个说辞可能十分过时，但其仍然是北京极其关切的问题：这既是一个国家安全问题，也是一个国家长久政治合法性的问题。从北京的角度看来，西藏、新疆、内蒙和台湾是中国安全利益的核心部分。这些区域各自代表了外部和内部安全因素的汇合点。在中国看来，西藏是中国与印度的战略关系的核心因素。考虑到国内伊斯兰分裂分子的不断激起的民族分裂运动，新疆是中国理解和走向伊斯兰世界的门户。尽管几十年前中国就与俄罗斯解决了边界问题，但内蒙古仍然是中国和俄罗斯之间战略焦虑的主要来源。而长期被视为美国在太平洋地区的航空母舰的台湾，从中国的战略角度看来，不仅是中国建立更安全、更被控制的海洋边疆的阻碍，更是妨碍祖国统一大业的障碍物。这些来自中国内部的安全挑战，将会是除了中国共产党安全问题以外，中国最核心、最重要的安全隐患。

The Economy and  Environmental Sustainability
经济和环境的可持续发展
The third in this series of concentric circles is the economy, together with its strategic counterfoil, environmental sustainability. I’ve already referred at some length to the current dilemmas in Chinese economic policy. Parallel dilemmas also confront the leadership over the litany of stories which permeate its own media on water, land and air pollution, and the inadequacy of food quality standards. The tragedy of China’s rapid economic development over the first 35 years was the relegation of the environment. Indeed, the systematic treatment of the environment as simply an “economic externality” to the Chinese development process led to wholesale environmental destruction. China is now paying the price.
第三个同心圆是中国的经济、可持续发展问以及以往战略政策的遗留问题。我之前已经详细介绍了中国经济目前的困境。而领导层同样还面临着一系列在媒体上广泛传播的水、土地和空气污染以及食品质量不达标的问题 。过去40年中国经济的快速发展的悲剧代价就是环境的恶化。的确，中国过去一直系统性地认为环境不过是经济发展的“经济外部性成本”，而这正是造成中国环境快速恶化的主要原因。中国正在为此付出代价。

Of course, these are not just domestic concerns for the Chinese people themselves. The quantum of China’s greenhouse gas emissions is of fundamental relevance to the future of global climate security and therefore of the planet itself. Indeed, if China fails to deliver on its future commitments on GHG reductions, as America and my own country Australia are now failing to do, by the time you students of the academy are taking your grandchildren to school during the last quarter of this century, the climate will represent the single greatest security threat to us all. But within the framework of China’s current and emerging worldview, both a strong economy and clean environment represent core determinants of the Party’s future political legitimacy.
当然，中国的环境问题不仅仅是中国人的自己问题。中国温室气体排放量与全球气候安全的未来以及地球本身本来就是密不可分的。事实上，如果中国，像美国和澳大利亚一样，未能履行温室气体减排的承诺，那么到本世纪的最后25年，等你们领着自己的孙子孙女去学校时，气候问题将会是所有人类面临的最大的安全威胁。不过对于中国的世界观而言，强大的经济和干净清洁的环境共同代表着共产党未来的政治合法性。
These existential questions, therefore, of clean water, useable land, uncontaminated fish stocks, clean air to breathe as well as continued jobs growth, increased living standards, and all within the constraints of an ageing population, represent the daunting, day-to-day challenges of China’s Communist Party leadership.
因此，这些关于清洁水资源、可用土地、未被污染的渔业资源、清洁空气，以及就业率增加、生活条件提高、控制人口老龄化等的问题对中国共产党的领导而言是最要紧、最艰巨的日常挑战。

China’s Neighbouring States - Securing China’s Continental Periphery across Eurasia
中国的邻国— 确保中国亚欧边境地区安全
The fourth in this widening series concentric circles relates to China’s fourteen neighbouring states. Neighbouring states occupy a particular place in China’s strategic memory. Historically, they’ve been the avenue through which China’s national security has been threatened, resulting in successive foreign invasions. From the Mongols in the North in the 12th century, to the Manchurians in the North East in the mid-17th century, to the British, French, the Western imperial powers including the United States, and then the absolute brutality of the Japanese occupation from the East.
这个同心圆的第四层涉及到中国的14个邻国。邻国在中国的战略记忆中一直占有特殊的地位。从历史上看了， 无论是12世纪蒙古族从北部入侵，到17世纪中期满族人从东北部入关，以及后来英法等西方帝国主义势力以及后来日本人从东部占领中国的领土，这些邻国一直是造成中国国家安全受到威胁，导致外国势力不断入侵的最主要途径。

In Chinese traditional strategic thought, this has entrenched a deeply defensive view of how to maintain China’s national security. But Chinese historiography also teaches that purely defensive measures have not always succeeded. The failure of the Great Wall of China to provide security from foreign invasion is a classic case in point.
在中国传统的战略思想中，对于如何维护中国的国家安全，中国深刻形成了防御性观念。但是，纵观中国历史，这种防御性措施并不是一劳永逸、永远有效的。中国长城未能为防止外来入侵提供安全保障就是一个非常典型的例子。

For these reasons, modern Chinese strategic thinking has explored different approaches. First and foremost, through political and economic diplomacy, China wishes to secure positive, accommodating, and wherever possible compliant relationships with all its neighbouring states.
由于这些原因，现代中国的战略思想探索了不同的方法。首先，通过政治和经济外交，中国希望与邻国的所有国家保持积极、顺畅和正面的关系。

But beyond that, China is also in search of its own form of strategic depth. We see this in China’s political, economic and military diplomacy across its vast continental flank from Northeast, through Central to Southeast Asia. We see this thinking alive in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. We see it alive in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia（CICA）. We see it also with the continental Silk Road, and the Maritime Silk Road initiative which charts its course across the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and now the Mediterranean. And beyond that we see the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. The strategic imperative is clear：to consolidate China’s relationships with outs neighbouring states. And by and large, this means enhancing its strategic position across the Eurasian continent, thereby consolidating China’s continental periphery.
但除此之外，中国也在不断开拓自己的战略纵深。我们从中国与横跨亚洲的国家的政治，经济和军事外交中可以清楚看到了这一点；我们可以从上海合作组织中看到这一点；我们从亚信峰会中可以看到这一点；从横跨印度洋、红海、和地中海的新陆上和海上丝绸之路可以看到这一点。除此之外，我们还看到一带一路倡议（BRI）。中国的战略需求是明确的：巩固与邻国的关系。总的来说，这意味着加强其在整个欧亚大陆的战略地位，从而巩固中国的大陆周边区域。

China’s Maritime Periphery - East Asia and the West Pacific
中国的周边海域— 东亚和西太平洋地区
The fifth concentric circle, or arguably its co-equal fourth, lies on China’s maritime periphery, across East Asia and the West Pacific. Unlike its continental periphery, China sees its maritime periphery as deeply hostile. It sees its traditional territorial claims in the East and South China Seas as under threat, and now routinely refers to these as China’s “core national interests”, placing them in a similar category to Taiwan. China also sees the region as strategically allied against it—with a ring of US allies from South Korea to Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines and onto Australia. Beyond this ring of US allies, the Chinese are fundamentally fixated on the formidable array of US military assets deployed by US Pacific Command across the entire region.
第五个同心圆，或者可以和第四个归为一类，是中国的与东亚以及西太平洋相接的海域。与中国的大陆边域不同，中国的周边海域可谓是危机重重。中国认为自己在东海、南海的主权问题一直受到威胁，东海和南海问题现在被视为中国的“核心利益问题”，几乎和台湾问题同等重要。中国也将该领域视为美国与它的盟国（南韩、日本、台湾、菲律宾、澳大利亚）对她形成的包围圈。除了这个联盟包围圈之外，中国根本上还是首要着眼于美国在整个太平洋地区的军事部署。
China’s strategy in response to this is clear. It seeks to fracture US alliances and has said as much repeatedly in its declaratory statements. Its position is that these alliances are relics of the Cold War. China’s deepest strategic concern about the peaceful reunification of North Korea lies in potentially having a unified Korean Peninsula, as a US ally, positioned on its immediate land border. China’s deeper response is to its strategic circumstances is to enhance the capability of its navy and air force. Under Xi Jinping, the change in China’s military organisation, doctrine and force structure has been profound. The army continues to shrink. The navy and air force continue to expand.
中国的战略回应十分清楚。中国不断在其声明性陈述中多次重复，它的主要目标是拆散美国的联盟，并不断强调美国的联盟是从冷战中的两极世界遗留下来的。中国对朝鲜半岛和平统一问题最深刻的战略担心在于，很有可能会有一个统一的亲美的朝鲜半岛与其相邻。因此，除了以上的战略性回应之外，中国也不断的在加强自己的海军和空军力量。在习近平的领导下，中国军事组织，理论和力量结构已经发生了巨大的变化。中国的海军和空军力量也在不断扩大。

Chinese naval and air capabilities now extend to reclaimed islands in the South China Sea. China’s naval and air expansion has also been enhanced by the rapid development of its land-based missile force targeted at both Taiwan and wider US naval operations in the Western Pacific. The strategic rationale is clear：a strategy of air-sea denial against US forces seeking to sustain large-scale US military operations in support of Taiwan, its partners in the South China Sea, and ultimately in the East China Sea as well. China’s overall political-military strategy is clear：to cause sufficient doubt in the minds of PACOM, and therefore any future US administration as to the “winnability” of any armed conflict against Chinese forces within the first island chain. And that includes American doubts over its ability to defend Taiwan.
中国的海军和空军力量已经部署到了中国南海的岛屿上。中国海空力量的不断壮大，同时也伴随着中国不断发展的陆地导弹部署，时刻准备对台湾问题和美国在西太平洋的海军部署作出回应。中国的战略性逻辑也很清晰：这一空海反介入战略意在对抗美国对台湾的大规模军事支持、美国在南海的合作伙伴以及中国东海问题。中国整体的政治军事战略也十分明确：迷惑美军的太平洋司令部，从而使美国政府无法估算未来美国在任何与中国的武力对抗中的胜率。同时也包括造成美国对其捍卫台湾的能力的怀疑。

The softer edge of China’s strategy in East Asia and the Western Pacific is economic engagement through trade, investment, capital flows and development aid. China’s strategy in this region, as in elsewhere in the world, is to turn itself into the indispensable economic power. In many countries and regions in the world, it has made great progress on this score. This, in many respects, is a simple projection of the scale of the Chinese economy as economic growth continues and China remains on track to pass the United States as the world’s largest economy over the course of the next decade.
中国在东亚和西太平洋地区也采取了相对柔和的战略，包括通过贸易、投资、资本流动和发展援助进行经济互动。中国在该地区的战略，和她在世界其他地方一样，是将自己变成不可或缺的经济力量。在世界上很多国家和地区，中国在这个目标上已经取得了非常好的成绩。从很多方面看了，这也是对中国经济未来发展的预测，如果中国的经济持续增长下去，中国有望在接下来的十年内超越美国成为世界上最大的经济体。
The bottom line is this：in both reality and in perception, China has already become a more important economic partner then the United States to practically every country in the wider East Asia. We all know where the wider strategic logic takes us. From economic power proceeds political power; from political power proceed foreign policy power; from foreign policy power proceeds strategic power. That is China’s strategy.
底线是：无论是在现实还是我们的理解中，中国都已成为美国以及东亚所有国家越来越重要的合作伙伴。我们都很清楚广义的战略逻辑是怎样的：从经济力量发展为政治力量，从政治力量发展为外交力量，再从外交力量发展为战略性力量。这也是中国的战略逻辑。

China’s and the Developing World
中国和发展中的世界
The sixth in my attempted visual image of China’s order of strategic priorities is China’s particular relationship with the developing world. This has long historical roots going back to Mao and Zhou Enlai’s role in the non-aligned movement. It applies particularly in Africa. But we also see it in countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. China’s relationship with the developing world has long been seen as a pillar in the prosecution of its global interests and values. In the current period this has continued with large scale public and private Chinese trade and investment across Africa, Asia and Latin America.
在我构建的中国战略优性先级别视觉图中，第六点是中国与发展中国家的关系。中国和发展中国家友谊对历史根源可以追溯到毛泽东和周恩来在不结盟运动中的角色和地位。中国与非洲的建交是中国重视与发展中国家关系中最显著的一点，当然从中国和巴基斯坦、斯里兰卡和孟加拉的关系中也不难看出这一点。长期以来，中国与发展中国家的关系被视为其全球利益和价值观的重要支柱。近来，中国与发展中国家的关系在中国于非洲、亚洲及拉美发展中国家的进行的公、私投资和贸易往来中又进一步加深、壮大。

Across Africa, China has laid out large slabs of the continent’s emerging infrastructure. Each of these projects is generating its own local controversies. But the remarkable thing about China’s strategy is its persistence and its ability to adapt and adjust over time. Multiple field studies have now been conducted by Western academics on Chinese investment projects in the developing world. Some have not been good. But what is remarkable is how many positive stories are also emerging, on balance. So when China looks for local voices to support its interests, either in the United Nations or across the labyrinth of the global multilateral system, its ability to pull in political and diplomat support is unprecedented.
在非洲，中国铺设了大量的基础设施建设。虽然这些项目中在当地都引发了一些争议，但是中国战略的卓越之处便在于其持久性和随时间适应和调整的能力。西方学者对中国在发展中国家的投资项目进行了多项实地研究。有些并不乐观，但是与此相对的是更多积极正面的故事也在发生。因此，当中国在联合国或全球多边体系的迷宫中寻求支持的声音时，其获得政治和外交支持的能力是前所未有的、无可比拟的。

China and the Global Rules-based Order
中国和基于规则的全球秩序
The seventh and final concentric circle concerns the future of the global rules-based order itself. The United States, combined with its allies, as the victors of the Second World War, constructed the underlying architecture of the post-war, liberal-international rules-based order. We saw this at Bretton Woods in 1944, the emergence of the IMF, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, later the WTO. We saw it in 1945 with the UN Charter. We saw it in 1948 with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
第七个，也是最后一个同心圆关注的是基于规则的全球秩序的未来。作为第二次世界大战的胜利者，美国及其盟友构建了战后基于自由国际规则秩序的基础结构。这一点不难从1944年的布雷顿森林会议中诞生的国际货币基金、世界银行、关税与贸易总协定以及后来的世界经贸组织中看出。1945年的《联合国宪章》以及1948年的《世界人权宣言》也都是这个全球秩序的具体体现。

The United States also sought to defend the order it had created with a global network of alliances：NATO in Europe, and bilateral security alliances across East Asia. Across all this, even during the Cold War, the United States remained the dominant superpower. Dominant politically, economically, and militarily. Now we find ourselves in a period of great change and challenge.
美国也通过在欧洲建立北约、在东亚建立双边安全联盟的方法捍卫自己在全球联盟中的地位。通过这些手段，即使是在冷战期间，美国依然是在政治、经济以及军事领域占主导地位的超级大国。然而，我们现在正处于一个巨大变化和挑战的时期。
Our western political systems are under challenge in terms of their own domestic legitimacy. China will soon replace the United States as the world’s largest economy. China will begin to challenge US regional but not global military dominance. China is also creating its own new multilateral institutions outside the UN framework, such as the AIIB. China also continues to expand its strategic and economic reach across Europe and Asia. And Xi Jinping has made plain he does not see China’s role as simply replicating the current US-led liberal international order for the future.
我们西方的政治制度在其国内合法性问题上正在面临挑战。中国很快就要取代美国成为世界最大的经济体；中国也会开始挑战美国军事区域性的主导地位；中国也一直在联合国体系外建立自己的多边体制，例如亚投行；中国也在继续扩大其在欧洲和亚洲的战略和经济贸易范围。同时，习近平也明确表示，他不认为中国是在复制当前美国领导的未来自由国际秩序。

China has consistently said that this was an order created by the Western, victorious and by and large colonial powers after the Second World War. But China leaves open what future changes it may make to the international rules-based system in the future. The desirability of having a form of rules-based system, rather than simple chaos, lies deep within Chinese political consciousness. Chaos is utterly alien to China’s preferred political approach. But it is important to remember that “order”, the alternative to “chaos”, will not necessarily be an American order, or for that matter a liberal-international order of America’s making, where Chinese co-leadership of that order may now be expected or desired.
中国不断表示，现在的自由国际秩序是二战后西方战胜国以及殖民国建立的。不过中国并没有明确表示她会对未来基于规则的全球秩序做出什么改变。在中国的政治意识中，建立一个基于规则的全球秩序比起简单自由的混乱秩序是更可取的。混乱的秩序与中国首选的政治途径大相径庭。不过，重要的是我们要认识到，替代“混乱”的“秩序”不一定是美国的秩序、也不一定是美国建立的自由国际秩序，中国所期望的是自己参与共同领导的全球秩序。
China’s expectation of the future of the order will be one which is more suited to China’s own national interests and values. This means China will want to change things. At this stage, it is not clear how much China wants to change things. And whether the rest of the international community will agree. This will have implications, for example, for the current international order on human rights, anchored in the three current international treaties and the human rights council in Geneva. It will also have implications for the future international economic order, including the WTO, particularly in the aftermath of any unfolding trade war with the United States. As for the future international security order, we now find ourselves in completely uncertain terrain for reasons increasingly shaped by the future contours of both American and Chinese domestic politics.
中国对未来全球秩序的期待当然是与自己的价值观和国家利益相吻合的。这就意味着中国会想要改变一些东西。目前看来，中国究竟想要改变什么并不清楚，也无法得知余下的国际社会是否会统一这些改变。比方说，这可能将对以日内瓦三项国际条约和人权理事会为基础的国际人权秩序产生影响。这也将对包括世贸组织在内的未来国际经济秩序产生影响，特别是在与美国爆发贸易战之后。至于未来的国际安全秩序，由于中国和美国的国内政治都在不断的勾划未来的轮廓，我们现在可以说是完全在不确定区域当中。

There is much public debate about Thucydides Trap on the probability of conflict between China and the United States. Just as there is now debate about the Kindleberger Trap, drawn from the experience of the 1920s and 1930’s, when we saw the emergence of strategic vacuum through the global retrenchment of the United Kingdom and an unwillingness of the United States to fill that vacuum in the provision of global public goods. The result was global anarchy of a different sort. My deepest belief is that we must avoid both these traps. Our deepest wisdom must be harnessed in defining another path.
关于中美是否会走入修昔底德陷阱的辩论是很多的。同样，现在也有很多关于金德尔伯格陷阱的辩论，该理论认为20世纪20-30年代， 英国的紧缩政策造成了战略真空状态，然而美国取代英国成为全球最大强权后却未能接替英国扮演为全球提供公共产品的角色，从而导致全球体系陷入衰退，引发了又一次的世界大战。我最深信的是，我们必须避免这两个陷阱。我们必须用最智慧来开辟另一条道路。

CONCLUSION
总结
There are many reasons to study China. It is an extraordinary civilisation in its own right. It contains deep wisdom, generated over more than 4000 years of recorded history. China’s aesthetic tradition is also rich beyond all measure. It is easy to become lost in the world of Sinology. But the rise of China demands of us all a New Sinology for the 21st century.
让我们去学习和了解中国的理由太多了：她本身就有着非凡的文明和文化；她蕴含着4000多年的历史孕育出的智慧；她的美学传统的世界影响也是无可估量的。中国的文化历史实在是太丰富悠久，我们很容易就会迷失在汉学的世界里。但是，中国的崛起，需要我们从“新汉学”的角度重新审视21世纪的中国。

One which is familiar with the Chinese tradition. One which is clear in its analysis of contemporary Chinese politics, economics, society and China’s unfolding role in the region and the world. As well as a new sinology which is capable of synthesising the above.
我们需要的“新汉学”不仅是对中国传统和历史的研究，同样也是对中国当代政治、经济、社会以及在区域和世界中地位和角色的研究。同时，“新汉学”也要对以上的所有方面进行整合。
We will need a generation of leaders who understand this integrated Chinese reality. In order to make sense of this Chinese reality to those who will need to engage with the China of the future. With our eyes wide open. And with our minds wide open as well. Open to new challenges. Open to new threats. Open to new possibilities. Open to new areas of cooperation and collaboration.
我们需要一代能够充分理解中国综合现实的领导人。为此，我们需要睁大眼睛、开放胸怀、勇敢面对新的挑战、新的威胁、新的可能性，不断在新的领域互相协助、合作，从而使那些未来与中国打交道的人们充分理解中国。

And above all, open to finding creative paths about how we preserve peace, preserve stability, avoid conflict and the scourge of war between these two great nations, while preserving the universal values, anchored in our international covenants, for which we all still stand.
最重要的是，我们需要找到一条可以维护和平、维护稳定、有效避免两个超级大国之间的矛盾，同时又能保留我们坚守的国际公约和普世价值观的创造性道路。